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We present, extend and estimate a model of international trade with firm heterogeneity in the 
tradition of Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). The model is constructed to yield testable 
implications for the dynamics of international prices, productivity levels and markups as functions of 
openness to trade at a sectoral level. The theory lends itself naturally to a difference in differences 
estimation, with international differences in trade openness at the sector level reflecting international 
differences in the competitive structure of markets. Predictions are derived for the effects of both 
domestic and foreign openness on each economy. Using disaggregated data for EU manufacturing 
over the period 1989-1999 we find evidence that trade openness exerts a competitive effect, with 
prices and markups falling and productivity rising. Consistent with theory however, these effects 
diminish and may even revert in the longer term as less competitive economies become attractive 
havens from which to export from. We provide evidence that this entry into less open economies 
induces pro-competitive effects overseas in response to domestic trade liberalization. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Increased openness is widely believed to induce competitive eﬀects. In response to greater
foreign competition and increased imports, proﬁt margins should fall as markups decline,
and average productivity should increase as marginal ﬁrms exit the industry. The intro-
duction of heterogeneous ﬁrms into models of international trade has provided detailed
predictions of the distributional dynamics induced by greater openness and the patterns
of entry, exit and relocation that occur in its wake. However, a direct link from these
models to empirical estimation remains elusive. This paper aims at ﬁlling this gap.
More speciﬁcally we develop a version of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) adapted to be
directly amenable to empirical analysis. In particular our empirical measure of open-
ness is derived from our theoretical model as are the reduced form expressions which
we estimate. Our theoretical speciﬁcation naturally suggests a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
estimation strategy in which international diﬀerences in sector-level inﬂation rates, pro-
ductivity growth and markups are all ascribed to international diﬀerences in openness
to trade. Thus, we are able to investigate the validity of the theoretical claim that it is
relative openness that aﬀects the relative extent of competition.
To test our model we use a cross section of manufacturing industries in seven Euro-
pean Union countries during the 1990s. We observe prices, productivity, markups, the
number of domestically producing ﬁrms and imports. We uncover support for signif-
icant pro-competitive eﬀects of trade openness, as measured by import penetration in
domestic markets. In response to increased imports, productivity rises, margins fall, and
prices grow at a (temporarily) lower rate. In a manner consistent with the theory these
eﬀects diminish and, in a non trivial number of cases, actually reverse themselves in the
long run. We verify that it is relative trade openness that matters for market structure.
Foreign and domestic openness to trade aﬀect prices, productivity and margins with op-
posite - and often equal - signs, at all horizons, again in a manner consistent with our
theory. Additional implications of our model, namely the importance of market size and
the number of ﬁrms, all receive support from the data as well.
Ours is by no means the ﬁrst attempt at quantifying the competitive eﬀects of trade.
A ﬁrst extensive strand of the literature uses cross country panel studies to examine
the eﬀects of aggregate trade openness on economic (or productivity) growth. This line
of work underscores the importance of theoretically sound aggregate measures of trade
1openness, and in particular the critical need to deal with the endogeneity of changes in
trade openness.1 This motivates our attempt to derive relevant measures of openness
from our theoretical model. We build on this literature in two further ways. We use
disaggregated sectoral data, and we test theoretical predictions that both domestic and
foreign openness may aﬀect domestic market structure.
A second branch of the literature attempts to assuage endogeneity concerns by study-
ing one-oﬀ liberalization events, typically in the developing world. These events often
occur as part of more general reforms and are liable to have diﬀerential eﬀects across
ﬁrms, whose cross section helps identiﬁcation.2 The disaggregated approach in some of
these studies inspires the present work although we focus not on “natural experiments”
but more gradual and continual processes of opening to trade. By using a cross section
of developed European economies we also make a nod to Treﬂer’s (2004) plea that “what
is needed is at least some research focusing on industrialized countries” (p.2).
Closest to our work are several recent papers using US data to inform the eﬀects
of openness on ﬁrm-level performance. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2005) examine
ﬁrms’ output response at the plant level to increases in imports with a particular focus
on within sector reallocations. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) ﬁtam o d e l
of heterogeneous ﬁrms and empirically characterise the behaviour of U.S. exporters, and
in particular their observed high productivity.3 Closely related to our work is Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2006), who use U.S. data to investigate the response of ﬁrm-level
productivity to falling trade costs at the sector level. The richness of their data enables
them to identify characteristics of exiting ﬁrms or new exporters. The ﬁrm level focus of
these studies provides substantial insight into the cross sectional dynamics of increased
trade. By contrast our use of sectoral data provides insights in diﬀerent dimensions.
1See, inter alia, Ades and Glaeser (1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, Spolaore and Warcziag
(2005), Alcalà and Ciccone (2003), Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) or Irwin and Tervio (2002).
2See, among many others, Corbo, de Melo and Tybout (1991) or Pavcnik (2002) on Chile; Ferreira
and Rossi (2003) on Brazil; Harrison (1994) on Ivory Coast; or Krishna and Mitra (1998) on India.
Topalova (2004) invokes the exogeneity of the 1991 Indian trade reform as part of a package sponsored
by the IMF. Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005) use the same episode but focus on diﬀerential
responses at the sector level according to the prevailing institutions. Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998)
use carefully timed data to account for the self selection of productive ﬁrms in export markets.
3This list is far from exhaustive. For instance, in recent work, Breinlich (2005) shows that mergers and
acquisitions are an empirically important channel through which trade openness brings about improved
ﬁrm performance. Kramarz (2003) estimates the impact on French wages, through reductions in worker
bargaining power, of increased imports.
2Firstly we focus on the impact across a number of European countries of diﬀerential
increases in international trade, and provide an alternative means of identifying the
impact of trade on non-US economies. Secondly our focus on European importers, and
our model’s implications on relative openness, leads naturally to a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
approach to estimation. In other words, identiﬁcation is not of how France responds to
increased imports, for instance, but rather of how France has been eﬀected diﬀerently
than Germany through diﬀerential changes in openness. Finally, our model has strong
predictions on the short and long run impact of trade liberalization. We exploit the
dynamic nature of our panel to investigate these eﬀects.
Thanks to our diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach, the aggregate component of sector
inﬂation rates can be accounted for directly in the estimation. This is important for
it helps focus the empirics upon the question of interest, namely the putative micro-
economic pro-competitive eﬀects of trade openness, and away from alternative macro-
economic mechanisms. Romer (1993) has argued trade openness aﬀects the conduct of
monetary policy, as depreciation costs erode the beneﬁts of surprise inﬂations to an ex-
tent that increases with openness. More recently Rogoﬀ (2003) argues that the inﬂation
bias under discretionary monetary policy decreases with the extent of competition, which
in turn improves with openness. Both explanations can explain the negative long run
correlation between inﬂation and trade over recent decades. Both eﬀects are directly
purged from our data thanks to their disaggregated dimension, so that, under our as-
sumptions, our sectoral estimates of the pro-competitive eﬀects of trade are immune to
alternative macroeconomic explanations. Separating out this eﬀect also throws light on
the direct impact that increased openness has had in lowering prices and contributing to
the decline in inﬂation during the 1990s.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline a theoretical model which
clariﬁes how changes in trade costs aﬀect prices, productivity and markups. Falls in
transport costs or tariﬀs lead to lower prices and margins due to heightened competition
from imports. Because ineﬃcient ﬁrms exit, trade also leads to lower average costs and
higher productivity. Section 3 develops from this theoretical framework the equations
we actually estimate. We reformulate the model in terms of directly observable import
shares rather than transport costs. We pay particular attention to separating the short
and long run dynamics of how openness impacts on the variables of interest. In Section 4
we tackle a number of econometric issues before proceeding in Section 5 to a discussion of
our disaggregated dataset, which covers ten manufacturing sectors across seven European
3nations over the period 1989-1999. Section 6 presents our econometric results, and
Section 7 considers various robustness checks. A ﬁnal Section concludes.
2T h e o r y
In this section, we develop a two country general equilibrium model built around the
work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). The theory oﬀers a structural model in which
prices, productivity and, in particular, markups of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms depend
on the number of ﬁrms supplying a market. Trade liberalization aﬀects the number of
ﬁrms and so aﬀects ﬁrm level performance. The model distinguishes between the short
and long run impact of trade liberalization. In the short run, trade has pro-competitive
eﬀects: falling transport costs lead to an increase in imports, greater competition and a
fall in prices and markups, which in turn raises average productivity as only the strongest
ﬁrms continue to produce. In the longer term however, the greater degree of competition
persuades ﬁrms to relocate their production overseas into more protected economies.
As a result the pro-competitive eﬀects of trade liberalization are reversed. This model
provides structure to the short and long run dynamics of the model, draws an important
distinction between domestic and overseas openness and allows for rich patterns in the
manner through which trade aﬀects market structure.
The main innovation in our paper is to take this theoretical structure and use it to
estimate the competitive impact of greater trade openness amongst EU nations. In doing
so we extend the model in two dimensions. Firstly, our theory points to a critical role
f o rat r a d ec o s tv a r i a b l e ,r e ﬂecting either transportation costs or tariﬀs. Reliable data
for trade costs are scarce so we use our model to substitute out for trade costs using
the more readily observable import share.4 Our second extension is to allow for cross
country heterogeneity in the cross sectional distribution of productivity. This serves both
to enrich the structure of our estimated model but also opens the door for our diﬀerence
in diﬀerences estimation strategy.
4See Harrigan (1999) for a discussion of measurement issues for transport costs, or Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2006) for an example of U.S based sector data on transport costs.
42.1 The Model
2.1.1 Demand
A representative agent has preferences over a continuum of sectors, indexed by i.U t i l i t y
from consumption in each sector is derived from a continuum of varieties indexed by
























with α,γ,η > 0. Varieties are perfect substitutes for γ =0 , in which case the agent
only cares about sectoral consumption Qi =
R
u qi
u du. Identical assumptions hold in
the foreign country, whose variables we denote by an asterisk. We denote the mass of
consumers in the home country by L. In what follows we omit sector-speciﬁc superscripts
unless the context is ambiguous.
Inverted demand for each variety is given by
pu = α − γqu − ηQi (1)
for qu > 0.T h i s d e ﬁnes Qi =( α − ¯ p) N/(γ + ηN) where N is the number of ﬁrms
competing in the sector (including both domestic producers and foreign exporters), and
¯ p = 1
N
R
u pu du is the aggregate sectoral price index. Demand for variety u remains




(αγ + ηN ¯ p) (2)
Using (1) and (2) and summing over all consumers gives total demand in the home
















Demand for each variety is linear in prices, but unlike the classic monopolistically compet-
itive setup introduced in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the price elasticity of demand depends
on N,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms in the sector, a feature introduced in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002). Variations in the number of competing ﬁrms is the key mechanism through
which trade liberalization eﬀects corporate performance.
52.1.2 Supply
Labor is the only factor of production and c denotes the ﬁrm’s unit labor cost. Labor is
perfectly mobile domestically between ﬁrms in the same sector, but not across countries.
International wage diﬀerences are therefore possible in each sector.5 As a result, unit
costs vary across ﬁrms in a sector purely for technological reasons, i.e. diﬀerences in
sectoral productivity. In contrast, sectoral unit costs vary across countries due to dif-
ferences in wages and technology. Domestic ﬁrms can sell to the domestic market, or
export but then they incur an ad-valorem cost τ∗ > 1,r e ﬂecting transportation costs
or tariﬀs determined in the foreign economy. Production for domestic markets has unit
cost c and for exports τ∗c. Transportation costs for foreign goods entering the domestic
economy are symmetrically denoted by τ. Entry and exit decisions entail a ﬁxed cost fE
which ﬁrms have to pay to establish production in whichever economy. In the short run
ﬁrms cannot change their location but can decide whether to produce or not and if they
decide to produce whether they should also export. In the long run ﬁrms can change
their location by paying fE.
Denote cD (c∗
D) as the unit cost of the marginal domestic (foreign) ﬁrm achieving
zero sales, for which inequality (2) is binding. A ﬁrm with unit costs c charges a price
p(c) and so we have p(cD)=cD and p∗(c∗
D)=c∗
D. The marginal exporting domestic ﬁrm
has costs cX = c∗
D/τ∗, while its foreign counterpart has costs c∗
X = cD/τ.D u et ot r a d e
costs, markets in diﬀerent countries are distinct and ﬁr m sh a v et oc h o o s eh o wm u c ht o
produce for domestic markets [qD(c) and q∗
D(c)] and how much for export [qX(c) and
q∗
X(c)]. Proﬁts from domestic sales are denoted ΠD and from exports by ΠX. Domestic
proﬁt maximization implies








To obtain closed form expressions for our key variables we follow Melitz (2003) and
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) and assume costs in each sector follow a Pareto distribution
with cumulative distribution function G(c)=(c
cM )k, c ∈ [0,c M].F o r k =1costs are
distributed uniformly, and as k increases so does the relative proportion of high cost
ﬁrms. To allow for cross-country productivity diﬀerences we extend the model so that
5In the empirical section, we assume perfect labor mobility across ﬁrms in the same sector, but take
no stance regarding labor mobility between sectors.
6the upper bound for costs diﬀers across countries, i.e. cM 6= c∗
M.I fcM < (>) c∗
M then
the domestic economy displays relatively low (high) cost and high (low) productivity.
This helps introduce our estimation strategy based on international diﬀerences in the
model’s endogenous variables.6
Under these distributional assumptions and optimal pricing, a ﬁrm with costs c sells
output to the domestic market at a price pD(c)=1
2(cD + c), c ∈ [0,c D] and for imports
the price is p∗
X(c)=1
2(cD +τc), c ∈ [0,c D/τ]. Given the distributional assumption for c,
exporters also face a Pareto distribution for their costs with density (cτ∗/cM)k.T h e r e -
fore, the costs for domestic ﬁrms that produce for the domestic market, or that export
(inclusive of trade costs) both follow a Pareto distribution. As a result the aggregate






















The same relations hold by symmetry in the foreign economy. Prices, markups, costs
and productivity are all pinned down by the value of threshold costs cD and c∗
D, whose
determination in equilibrium we now consider.
2.2 Market Structure and Trade Liberalization
2.2.1 Demand, Varieties and Competition
In this section we outline the intuition for the dynamic eﬀects of trade liberalization in
the model. The essential mechanisms are inspired from Melitz and Ottaviano (2005),
with the added ingredients of international heterogeneity in productivity, trading costs
6Ghironi and Melitz (2005) introduce cross-country heterogeneity by assuming a stochastic country-
speciﬁc productivity term. While this introduces some features shared by our model it diﬀers in that
heterogeneity arises from ex post variation. In our model ex ante variation in costs across countries
aﬀects ﬁrms entry decisions and industry cut oﬀ costs.
7and wages. We spend time on the intuition for diﬀerences between short and long term
responses, as this will be an interesting aspect of our empirical work.
N denotes the number of ﬁrms active in the domestic market, and N∗ the number
supplying to overseas markets. The number of ﬁrms supplying a market is made up of
both domestic producers and foreign exporters. For the marginal ﬁrm in the domestic









γ + ηN∗ (αγ + ηN∗ ¯ p∗)















The demand curve therefore implies a negative relationship between the number of ac-
tive ﬁrms supported by the market and the threshold costs of the marginal ﬁrm. This
relationship is shown in Figure 1 by the downward sloping curve. High values for cD lead
to high prices, limited demand, and so a limited number of ﬁrms and varieties. Note
that equations (4) and (5) simply summarize the demand side of the economy and do not
depend directly on transportation costs. The negative relationship in equations (4) and
(5) between number of ﬁrms and threshold costs is not aﬀected by trade liberalization.
2.2.2 Short Run Implications of Trade Liberalization
In the short run, ﬁrm location is ﬁxed and their decision is whether to produce or not
and which markets to supply, bearing in mind that exports incur the transport costs
τ or τ∗.H i g h c o s t ﬁrms decide not to produce but do not relocate. The lowest cost
ﬁrms produce for domestic markets as well as export and an intermediate group of ﬁrms
produce only for the domestic market.
In the short run, the number of ﬁrms that consider their production choices in each
economy, ¯ NSR and ¯ N∗
SR,i sﬁxed parametrically. Given the distribution of costs and as
8only ﬁrms with c<c D (c<c ∗
D abroad) actually choose to produce, the number of ﬁrms
active in each market is given by

































Equations (6) and (7) reﬂect the supply side of the economy and ﬁrms production
decisions. The higher the threshold level of costs, cD, the larger the number of ﬁrms
(both domestically located and exporters) that decide to produce. Equation (6) is shown
in Figure 1 by the upward sloping relationship. In contrast to the demand relationship
(4), changes in transport costs aﬀect the production decisions of ﬁrms and shift the
relationship between N and cD. For a given level of cD, a fall in transport costs τ means
more foreign ﬁrms selling to the domestic market, an increase in imports and a rise in
N.T h i se ﬀect is captured in Figure 1 where the supply schedule shifts right in response
to a fall in transport costs. In equilibrium, N rises and cD falls in response to a fall in
trading costs.
The increase in foreign ﬁrms exporting to the domestic market leads to a rise in
varieties and so raises the elasticity of demand. Given the structure of the market this
results in a fall in markups and prices and, as a result, the higher cost domestic ﬁrms
and foreign exporters cease production. The end result is a net increase in N (even
though some domestically produced ﬁrms are displaced by foreign exports), lower prices,
lower markups and a trade induced rise in average productivity. In the short run, trade
liberalizations have the standard pro-competitive eﬀects.
2.2.3 Long Run Implications of Trade Liberalization
In the long run ﬁrms can decide to relocate elsewhere and then incur the ﬁxed cost
fE. Letting NLR and N∗
LR denote the endogenous long run equilibrium number of ﬁrms


































9However NLR and N∗
LR are no longer ﬁxed but now vary due to ﬁrm entry and exit. In
the long run, the number of ﬁrms located in a country is determined by free entry and

















Under our Pareto distributional assumption for costs these expressions simplify to
φc k
M = Lc k+2





k = L∗ (c∗
D)
k+2 + Lτ 2 (c∗
X)
k+2



































where Υ =1− τ−k (τ∗)
−k. Equations (10) and (11) replace (6) and (7) in the long run,
while equations (4) and (5), reﬂecting demand and preferences, remain unaltered. As
in the long run entry and exit are endogenous, there is no longer a direct relationship
between N and cD. Instead the marginal level of costs is pinned down by the distribution
of costs (cM), the level of ﬁxed costs (φ), market size (L) and trade costs (Υ). The
supply side of the economy is no longer characterized by an upward sloping schedule but
a horizontal line, as in Figure 2. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms located in an economy
is determined by the intersection of this line with the downward sloping curve originating
from consumer preferences.
We can use Figure 2 to consider the long run implications of trade liberalization.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a decrease in domestic trading costs, τ. This leads to an
upward shift in marginal costs, as given by equation (10), and in equilibrium, to a fall in
N.7 As a result of the increase in cD, from our earlier analysis, we also have an increase
7Equations (4), (5), (8) and (9) can be used to solve for N, N
∗, NLR and N
∗
LR.
10in prices and markups and a fall in productivity. Therefore the long run impact of falling
trade costs is the exact opposite of their short run impact. In the short run, lower trade
costs lead to more intense competition and lower margins. In the long run ﬁrms respond
to this increase in competition by shifting to more protected markets overseas. The
f a l li nt r a d ec o s t sm a k e si tm o r ev i a b l et os e r v et h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e tt h r o u g he x p o r t s
from overseas, whilst simultaneously lessening the attraction of remaining in place and
producing for the domestic market. The result is a decline in ﬁrms serving the domestic
market, which through the demand relationship, leads to higher costs and prices.
Whilst our model generates an anti-competitive long run response to domestic trade
liberalization, falls in overseas trade costs are pro-competitive. As shown in Figure 2
af a l li nτ∗ leads to a downward shift in the horizontal line given by equation (10), an
increase in N,af a l li ncD and so a fall in prices and markups. A fall in overseas trade
costs encourages ﬁrms to relocate from overseas. This increases the number of ﬁrms and
the level of domestic competition. This theoretical discussion points to two key facts for
our empirical analysis. Firstly, the need to model the dynamic response of competition to
trade and to allow for diﬀerential eﬀects at diﬀerent horizons. Secondly the importance
of distinguishing between changes in domestic and foreign openness.
3 Towards an Estimable Model
In this section we lay the foundations for our empirical analysis. We do so by deriving
estimable equations in terms of observable variables using the theory from the previous
section.
3.1 Openness and Import Share
The key parameters of trade liberalization in our model are τ and τ∗, but reliable es-
timates are notoriously diﬃcult to obtain, especially at the sectoral level. We use our
model to substitute out for τ in terms of directly observable indicators of trade open-
ness. The key variable for our analysis will be domestic absorption which in our model
can be shown to depend only on domestic transport costs and relative productivity. By


















2 (cD + c) and p∗
X(c)=τ
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Domestic openness falls with the transport costs applied to foreign imports, and increases



































We use these expressions to replace unobservable trade costs with observed import shares.
3.2 Prices
3.2.1 Short Run











. In the short run,
































12From equation (12) we see that in the short run relative prices fall with domestic openness
(θ) but rise with foreign openness (θ∗).8 Ar i s ei nθ corresponds to a fall in τ and our
openness channel traces through the eﬀects described in Figure 1. Therefore in the short
run, conditional on ¯ NSR/N and ¯ N∗
SR/N ∗, increases in openness lead to falls in relative
domestic prices. In the short run ¯ NSR and ¯ N∗
SR are ﬁxed, but N and N∗ vary as trade
liberalization leads to increased imports and fewer domestic ﬁrms producing. Our data
contain information on prices and openness but not on N, the total number of ﬁrms
supplying to the domestic market. Instead we have data on D, the number of domestic






equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) can be combined to show that D = Ψ(τ,τ∗) N where
Ψτ > 0.9 In other words, falls in τ lead to a negative relationship between D and N.
Equation (12) therefore suggests that, conditional on the level of openness, relative prices
fall with an increase in the number of domestically producing ﬁrms (D)a n dr i s ew i t ha n
increase in the number of foreign producing ﬁrms (D∗).
3.2.2 Long Run























The eﬀect of openness is no longer conditional on the number of ﬁrms. An increase in
domestic openness θ now leads to a rise in relative prices, while an increase in overseas
openness θ∗ engenders a fall. In addition, large markets, as indexed by L, support a
larger number of ﬁrms and have lower prices.
3.2.3 Combining Short and Long Run
We seek to evaluate simultaneously a short run relationship between relative prices,
the number of domestically producing ﬁrms and openness and a long run relationship
8Equation (12) is derived using only the upward sloping supply schedule in Figure 1. We could further
use equations (4) and (5) to solve for non-linear expressions for N and N
∗.























To see why Ψτ > 0 consider the following. Figure 1 shows that decreases in τ lead to an increase in N





and NSR and cM ﬁxed in the short run, D must be increasing
in τ.
13between relative prices, market size and openness, where the eﬀect of openness is allowed







= β0 + β1 ∆lnθit + β2 ∆lnθ∗








+ δ0 + δ1 lnLt−1 + δ2 lnL∗
t−1
+δ3 lnθit−1 + δ4 lnθ∗
it−1} + εijt (14)
where i denotes sector, a star denotes the foreign country and t is time. The diﬀer-
ence terms capture short run relationships, whilst the error correction term in brackets
captures the long run relationship in levels. The error correction model will improve
the eﬃciency of our estimates so long as relative prices and relative openness are all
integrated of order one, which we verify later. If β1 < 0 then domestic openness has
pro-competitive eﬀects on domestic relative prices in the short run. In the long run,
relative prices rise in response to openness if δ3 < 0.A st h ee ﬀects of changes in foreign
openness on the domestic market have the opposite eﬀect we expect β2 > 0 and δ4 > 0.
This framework also enables us to assess whether relative openness is what eﬀectively
matters in the data by testing the restrictions β1 + β2 =0and δ3 + δ4 =0 .
Our theory also has precise implications on the importance of ﬁrm dynamics and
on relative market size, both at home and abroad. In the short run, the number of
domestic ﬁrms aﬀects prices negatively (β3 < 0), while its foreign counterpart acts to
increase domestic inﬂation (β4 > 0). Equation (12) suggests coeﬃcients should however
n o tb ee q u a l . M a r k e ts i z es h o u l da ﬀect the long run dynamics of relative prices: the
size of the domestic economy aﬀects growth in relative prices negatively if δ1 > 0,a n d
a large foreign market should have the opposite eﬀect (δ2 < 0) with the model requiring
δ1 + δ2 =0 .
Equation (14) exactly captures our diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. Prices (and all
independent variables) are expressed in ﬁrst diﬀerences - which accounts among others
for the use of indices to measure some of our variables - and we identify diﬀerential eﬀects
across the same sector in diﬀerent countries. As both equations (12) and (13) include
terms in cM
c∗
M we also need to include intercepts for each country pair to control for cross
country variations in technology.10
10We also experimented with an intercept that varies per sector and per year, reasoning that the
technological frontier may be sector-speciﬁc and time varying. All our results carry through, even more
strongly in most cases.
143.3 Mark Ups
In our model, relative international markups depend directly on cD
c∗
D,j u s ta sp r i c e sd o .







= β0 + β1 ∆lnθit + β2 ∆lnθ∗








+ δ0 + δ1 lnLt−1 + δ2 lnL∗
t−1
+δ3 lnθit−1 + δ4 lnθ∗
it−1} +  ijt (15)
3.4 Productivity
Our model is written in terms of unit costs, c, but under relatively mild assumptions we
can derive implications for labor productivity, which enables a more direct comparison
with other studies. Let z denote average sectoral labor productivity. We approximate
¯ c = w/z,w h e r ew denotes nominal wages at the sector level. In so doing we are implicitly
assuming away diﬀerences in capital costs. With mainstream theories of international
trade based around variations in factor intensity this is a non-trivial assumption, opening
the door for the possibility that any role we ﬁnd for openness in inﬂuencing productivity
may just reﬂect an omitted variable bias due to capital costs. However, while diﬀerences
in factor intensity will undoubtedly produce more trade between countries it should
not necessarily produce a positive relationship between productivity and openness. Our
results would require that factor intensity varies in the same sector across countries in
a manner that correlates highly with openness.11 In addition, while factor intensity
issues may aﬀect interpretation of our productivity results it does not necessarily do
the same for prices, and even less for margins or market structure. Further, given that
our ﬁrms represent a cross section of European manufacturing we might also expect
variations in capital intensity to be limited. This is conﬁrmed in Section 7 where amongst
11The Heckscher-Ohlin view of international trade implies capital-rich countries (such as the EU)
specialize in capital intensive sectors. As specialization occurs, labor intensive industries contract as
imports take over. The decline in labor intensive industries will also lower wages and help lower prices in
these sectors. Therefore we could see systematically rising import shares and falling prices in a number
of sectors with shrinking domestic production. But this will only happen if stark enough international
diﬀerences in factor intensity exist across countries to motivate international specialization in production.
In addition, this would only explain a negative correlation between prices and import shares in the
receiving economy. In the exporting economy, prices and import shares will be positively correlated.
15our robustness tests we present results including measures of capital intensity in our
estimation.



















cM ,w h e r ezM
and z∗
M denote productivity in the least competitive ﬁrm for each sector. Using equation
























where international relative wages are subsumed in zM
z∗
M , a measure of each country’s
relative distance from the productivity frontier. A rise in domestic openness boosts
domestic productivity through a truncation eﬀect on less productive domestic producers.
This eﬀect of openness is conditional upon ¯ NSR/N w h i c ha sb e f o r ew ea p p r o x i m a t ew i t h
D, the number of domestically producing ﬁr m s ,w h i c hw eo b s e r v e . A si nF i g u r e1 ,
increases in the number of domestic ﬁr m sl e a d st oaf a l li ncD and a rise in productivity.
Ceteris paribus, foreign openness and the number of foreign ﬁrms have the opposite
impact.


















Productivity is highest in the larger economy (L) but responds negatively to in-
creases in domestic openness due to relocation eﬀects. The size of the foreign market,








= β0 + β1 ∆lnθit + β2 ∆lnθ∗








+ δ0 + δ1 lnLt−1 + δ2 lnL∗
t−1 + δ3 lnθit−1
+δ4 lnθ∗
it−1 + δ5 lnwit−1 + δ6 lnw∗
it−1} + ηijt (16)
16The short term eﬀects of domestic openness on domestic productivity are positive
(β1 > 0), but revert in the long run (δ3 > 0). The exact opposite is true of foreign
openness (β2 < 0,δ 4 < 0). The number of domestic ﬁrms increases relative domestic
productivity in the short run (β3 > 0),t h en u m b e ro ff o r e i g nﬁr m sd o e st h ee x a c to p po s i t e
(β4 < 0). Market size matters in the long run. Domestic and foreign coeﬃcients should
be equal as regards openness and market size in the long run, but not for the number of
ﬁrms in the short run. In addition, relative wages enter only in the long run.
4E c o n o m e t r i c I s s u e s
4.1 Stationarity
In order to eﬀectively discriminate between the short and long run implications of trade
openness our approach requires that our key variables be non-stationary in a unit root
sense. In Table 3 we provide the results of a battery of panel unit root tests used to
investigate the hypothesis of non-stationarity in international relative prices, relative
openness and relative productivity. All these variables are measured at the sector level,
and for all possible pairs of countries in our data, but only over ten years. Given the
limited time dimension of our panel we implement the procedure described in Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003), which allows for individual unit root processes, and augment it with
the possibility that residuals be correlated across sectors of a same country, as proposed
in Pesaran (2003). In addition, we also present the results of the tests proposed by
Hadri (2000) and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). In almost all cases we fail to reject the
presence of a unit root in relative prices, productivity and openness, whether the process
is assumed to be common across individuals or not, and whether we allow for the inclusion
of deterministic trends or not. These results support the error correction formulation in
our estimated equations. In what follows, we estimate our equations with and without
the error correction terms.
4.2 Lagged Dependent Variables
We have used our error correction formulation to disentangle the short and long run
response of variables to openness. Our model is however silent on how long the short
17run lasts and how long the dynamics to the long run take to complete. To alleviate
this problem we introduce lagged dependent variables into our estimation. Reassuringly
our main results are robust to the inclusion or otherwise of lagged dependent variables.
In dealing with dynamics in this way we create the well known problem of estimating
within-group equations with a lagged dependent variable. In our sensitivity analysis,
we verify that our conclusions withstand the induced bias by using the proper GMM
estimators introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991).
4.3 Nominal Prices
Our model is one of real relative prices at the sector level. However, prices in general
are inﬂuenced by aggregate nominal developments, which are distinct from the pro-
competitive eﬀects of openness we are seeking to evaluate. Empirically however, aggre-
gate inﬂuences on prices may well correlate signiﬁcantly with openness, as exempliﬁed
by the mechanism stressed in Romer (1993). It is important to purge these eﬀects from
the estimates we obtain here. Our disaggregated approach makes this readily possible,
under the hypothesis that aggregate monetary shocks aﬀect all sectors homogeneously.
To ﬁx ideas, we augment the expression (14) with measures of aggregate price indices P
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} + ξijt (17)
Adding aggregate prices in this manner implicitly assumes that monetary inﬂuences have
relatively homogeneous eﬀects across sectors or, more precisely, that if some heterogene-
ity exists it is uncorrelated with openness. Peersman and Smets (2005) ﬁnd that it is
durability or the existence of ﬁnancial constraints that are most important in explaining
the diﬀerential eﬀects of monetary policy across sectors, rather than openness.
184.4 Endogeneity
The key variable in our model is τ,r e ﬂecting trade costs. In our empirical strategy
we substitute import shares for τ. However, import penetration θ is an endogenous
variable reﬂecting the inﬂuence of potentially many factors. For instance, consumers in
high price economies will respond by buying imports, which leads to a positive bias for
our estimates of the eﬀect of openness on prices. Issues may also arise for the relation
between productivity and openness. Firms in low productivity sectors may lobby for
protectionism, which leads to a positive bias in the estimate of openness on productivity.
We have to use instrumental variables. We ﬁrst instrument import shares with a measure
of the “bulkiness” of the goods imported.12 While cross-sectional variation in imports
is aﬀected by their weight, it is unclear how bulkiness could aﬀect sector productivity
or competitiveness. Second, we build on the large literature explaining trade ﬂows with
so called “gravity” variables. We instrument import penetration in sector i and into
country j with a weighted average of output shares of sector i in all other countries in
our sample, where weights are given by geographic distance. In particular, we compute
Gravityijt =
yijt/Yjt P
k6=j  jk yikt/Ykt
where  jk denotes the (inverse of) the geographic distance between countries j and k.
The intuition is straightforward: country j will tend to import goods i from country k
i f( i )t h es h a r eo fs e c t o ri is relatively smaller in country j,( i i )c o u n t r yk is relatively
close.13 In other words, low values of Gravityijt lead to a higher import share.
Our third instrument uses sectoral information on transport costs. The trade data
we use reports both bilateral import and export ﬂows, whose ratio gives an indication
of transport costs, as the former include “Costs, Insurance and Freight”, whereas the
latter are typically registered “Free On Board”.14 We also include some measure of pan-
European changes in trade policy, such as a binary variable capturing the advent of the
Single Market in 1992 and the re-entry of the Lira in the European Monetary System in
12The measure is the ratio of the imports weight (in tons) to their value. This approach follows
Hummels (2001).
13The set of countries k includes: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the US.
14These data are too noisy to be used as direct proxies for τ or τ
∗. For instance, Harrigan (1999)
recommends averaging observed values for each sector across countries to minimize measurement error.
191996. Taken together, these three instruments explain approximately 40 percent of the
v a r i a t i o ni ni m p o r ts h a r e s .
5D a t a
Our database covers the period 1989 to 1999 for 7 European Union countries and 10
manufacturing sectors. We use for our price data domestic manufacturing production
prices, as measured by factory gate prices in national currency. The source for this data is
Eurostat, the Statistical Oﬃce of the European Commission. Price indices are available
for most European Union countries between 1980 and 2001, and disaggregated at the two-
digit NACE (revision 1) level.15 We normalize all indices to equal 100 in 1995. Eurostat
also collects data on total and bilateral exports and imports for manufacturing industries
(in thousand Ecus), together with their corresponding weight (in tons), available at the
four-digit NACE (revision 1) level. The data run between 1988 and 2001 for twelve EU
countries. To achieve consistency with our price data we aggregate this trade data to
the two-digit level.
To construct estimates of markups we use the Bank for the Accounts of Companies
Harmonized (BACH) database, which contains harmonized annual account statistics of
non-ﬁnancial enterprises in eleven European countries, Japan and the US.16 Data are
available annually between 1980 and 2002 are broken down by major sector and ﬁrm
size. We focus on seven EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain. To compute markups in sector i,c o u n t r yj and year t,
one would ideally need data on prices and marginal costs. Marginal costs are hard to
observe. We follow a considerable literature in Industrial Organization and measure











where total variable costs are computed as the sum of the costs of materials, consumables
and staﬀ costs. We exclude ﬁxed costs to avoid any biases in estimating markups. As
15NACE (revision 1) is the General Industrial Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities within the European
Union.
16The data are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_ﬁnance/indicators/bachdatabase_en.
htm.
17See, inter alia, Conyon and Machin (1991a,b).
20trade costs fall, an increase in the number of foreign ﬁrms will lead to falling market
share for domestic producers and a rise in average total costs, as ﬁxed costs are spread
across a smaller level of production. This will generate a negative bias between measured
markups and openness. In order to ensure consistency between our two- and three- digit
NACE price indices and the BACH cost data we aggregate up the price data, as described
in the Appendix.18
The value of exports and imports, together with their tonnage, are also aggregated
across NACE industries into their BACH equivalent. To compute openness (as the share
of imports into eﬀective consumption) we use the BACH database. We construct output
through the deﬁnition that value added equals the value of turnover, plus or minus the
changes in stocks of ﬁnished products, work in progress and goods and services purchased
for resale, plus capitalized production and other operating income. Our measure of
openness is then the ratio of imports relative to the sum of imports and sectoral output
net of exports.
Labor productivity is calculated as the ratio between real value-added and total
employment, as provided by the OECD. We use value-added and employment data from
Eurostat in the few cases where BACH sectors are not reported in the OECD data. The
number of ﬁrms is directly taken from the BACH database. The value of GDP is from the
OECD Economic Outlook as are the consumer prices we use as our measure of aggregate
prices. In total we observe ﬁve sectors in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, eight
in Germany, seven in Spain and four in France and in Italy. Sectoral output values (at
the ISIC revision 3 level) used to calculate our gravity instrument, are taken from the
OECD STAN database (in millions of units of national currency). Bilateral distances (in
kilometers) are calculated based on the “great circle distance” formula due to Fitzpatrick
and Modlin (1986).
We present summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2. Our measure of sectoral inﬂation
is highest in Spain and Italy, and lowest in France, where a few sectors saw their relative
prices fall. Denmark is the least open of our European economies on the basis of the
import share of production, while the Netherlands and Spain are particularly open. The
most open of our sectors is Textiles, followed by Machinery. Productivity is highest
in France and lowest in Spain, and highest in Chemicals and lowest in Textiles. Our
markup data suggest margins are lowest on average in Belgium, and highest in Denmark,
18We weight each NACE sub-sector by its share in GDP.
21the country that is least open in our sample. Markups range between 0.7 and 73.6
percent. They are highest on average in Non-Metallic Minerals. Table 3 suggests import
penetration increased most in Belgium, while it actually fell in Italy, indeed across most of
the sectors we observe. In terms of sectors, openness increased most in Oﬃce Machinery,
followed by Chemicals, and least in Rubber Products and Furniture. Figure 3 illustrates
the cross-section of interest, where we plot the behavior of import penetration over time
for our nine sectors. Two things are apparent from the Figure. First, some sectors
opened up more than others. Second, within each sector, some countries opened up
more than others. Both dimensions achieve identiﬁcation, in that we conjecture that
cross-country diﬀerences in the extent of openness at the level of a given sector ought to
have diﬀerential eﬀects on productivity, margins and prices.
6 Empirical Results
We focus ﬁrst on the short run results, estimated on ﬁrst diﬀerences only. Under non-
stationarity, these are consistent but not eﬃcient. We then include error correction
terms, and investigate the validity of the reversal implied by theory.
6.1 Short Run
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present our results on the eﬀects of openness on prices, productivity
and markups, respectively. The theoretical counterparts to our estimations are equations
(17), (15) and (16), without an error correction term. We have implemented the diﬀerence
in diﬀerences approach on all available country pairs in our sample. All three tables
ﬁrst present results under Ordinary Least Squares, and then instrument openness. We
also investigate the importance of lagged dependent variables and constrain some of the
coeﬃcients of interest to be equal across countries, as implied by theory.
Table 4 focuses on the price eﬀects of openness in the short run. We ﬁrst investigate
the relation between relative prices and import penetration, conditional on the number
D of ﬁrms eﬀectively based in each economy. The signs are as predicted, and almost
always signiﬁcant. Columns (2), (3) and (4) include relative openness, relative aggregate
prices and lagged dependent variables, respectively. First, domestic and foreign openness
22have opposite signs that are signiﬁcant and consistent with theory. In other words, do-
mestic openness aﬀects domestic prices negatively, whereas foreign openness aﬀects them
positively. The result stands when controls for aggregate price dynamics and sluggish
price adjustments are included, and indeed strengthen both in terms of signiﬁcance and
magnitude. Interestingly, tests of coeﬃcient equality in columns (1) to (3) suggest that
perfect symmetry in the eﬀects of domestic and foreign openness cannot be rejected at
standard conﬁdence levels. By contrast the impact of number of ﬁr m si sn o ts y m m e t r i c ,
as implied by theory.19 Column (4) constrains the coeﬃcients on import penetration to
be the same internationally, and includes relative openness, the relative number of ﬁrms
and relative aggregate prices. This tends to sharpen the results. The last three columns
of the Table introduce the instruments for openness, with or without lagged dependent
variables, and with or without controls for aggregate prices. All conclusions stand.
Table 5 focuses on productivity, based on equation (16). OLS results are strong.
Domestic openness increases domestic productivity, foreign openness acts to diminish it.
What is more, it is impossible to reject equality between the two coeﬃcients (in absolute
value), as predicted by the theory. By the same token the number of domestic ﬁrms
also acts (conditionally) to increase productivity, and vice versa as regards the foreign
market structure. Coeﬃcient equality is however strongly rejected, as per our model.
Columns (4) and (5) present our Instrumental Variables results, which conﬁrm all these
conclusions.20
Table 6 introduces markups as a dependent variable, as per equation (15). Once
again, OLS results are strong: domestic openness acts to reduce proﬁt margins, the
opposite is true of foreign openness, both coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. By
the same token, the number of domestic ﬁrms has a pro-competitive eﬀects on margins,
19The former can be rejected at the 39% conﬁdence level, whereas the latter at the 13% level only.
20It is possible that signiﬁcant eﬀects of openness on productivity might arise from the availability of
cheap foreign intermediate goods, whose import could act to increase θit. There are several reasons why
this cannot account for our ﬁndings. The ﬁr s ti st h a tw ea l s oﬁnd an eﬀect of openness on markups, which
cannot be explained through increases in intermediate inputs. In addition, imported intermediate goods
cannot possibly account for the eﬀects of foreign openness on domestic productivity, nor the reversal
we ﬁnd at long horizons. Finally, it may be that intermediate goods are obtained cheaply because of
movements in the nominal exchange rate rather than for diﬀerences in production eﬃciency. That would,
for instance, happen if imports were priced in the exporter’s currency, and it would imply that movements
in the nominal exchange rate aﬀect relative productivity, and therefore relative prices. In our sensitivity
analysis we verify that the inclusion of nominal exchange rates in equation (15) aﬀects none of our results.
23the number of foreign ﬁrms has the opposite impact, but the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. The results strengthen under IV estimations.
6.2 Long Run
Tables 7, 8 and 9 report the results corresponding to equations (17), (16) and (15), re-
spectively, where we now include error correction terms. The inclusion of error correction
terms enables us to estimate the long run impact of trade liberalization and in particular
whether the model’s implication of a reversal is supported in the data.
Estimates of equation (17) are shown in Table 7.21 The short run results that relative
openness (and the relative number of ﬁrms) have pro-competitive eﬀects on prices con-
tinues to obtain albeit at somewhat weaker signiﬁcance levels. The Table is interesting
for two reasons. First, there is a reversal of the eﬀects of relative openness on prices. In
the long run, domestic openness exerts an upward pressure on relative prices, whereas it
is now foreign openness that acts negatively on relative prices. This is a direct vindica-
tion of the theory, which is statistically signiﬁcant in our speciﬁcations. Second, market
size (measured here by real GDP) enters the estimation with the coeﬃcients predicted
by theory: a relatively large economy tends to have relatively low prices. What is more,
the coeﬃcients are not remotely signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. These conclusions all stand (and
indeed strengthen) when we instrument.
Table 8 summarizes the results that pertain to equation (16). Once again, the short
run pro-competitive eﬀect of relative openness (and the relative number of ﬁrms) on
relative productivity stand, signiﬁcantly so in almost all cases. As with the relative price
equation, the data show evidence of a reversal at longer horizon. Relative productivity
apparently falls in the long run in the wake of trade liberalization, i.e. falls in relative
openness. Relative market size also enters with signs that are consistent with theory and
signiﬁcant.
Finally, markups are examined in Table 9. Once more, pro-competitive eﬀects on
margins continue to obtain in the short run even once error correction terms are included,
21To conserve space we no longer quote p-values for testing the coeﬃcient restrictions on domestic
and foreign variables. These are available upon request but, as in Tables 4, 5 and 6, the restrictions are
accepted.
24and once again, there is (some) evidence of a reversal at long horizons. In the long run,
domestic relative openness acts to increase margins, at least on the basis of our point
estimates. In one out of four cases, the eﬀect is still signiﬁcant.22
7R o b u s t n e s s
In this Section we review a number of alternative speciﬁcations and controls we imple-
mented to ensure the stability of our results. First, we verify that including changes in
nominal exchange rates does not alter our conclusions, as it would under some speciﬁc
kinds of pricing to market or if intermediate inputs were captured in our import share
measure. Second, we attempt to account directly for the possibility that some of our
results could be accounted for by a simple Heckscher-Ohlin argument. If this mechanism
were at work we should ﬁnd that openness matters only through its interaction with
factor endowments. To test this we augment our speciﬁcations with an interaction term
between aggregate capital accumulation and sectoral capital shares. If openness remains
signiﬁcant, it suggests we are identifying a diﬀerent eﬀect than Hecksher-Ohlin. Finally,
we implement the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to account
for the fact that we run a ﬁxed eﬀect estimation with lagged dependent variables. The
results of these exercises are shown in Appendix B, C and D respectively. In all cases
our results remain intact.
Two further extensions are worth mentioning. Firstly we estimate the impact of
openness focusing just on deviations from a benchmark economy, rather than all pos-
sible bilateral pairs as previously. Although this lessens substantially the number of
observations it helps reduce measurement error problems and oﬀers a sharper treatment
eﬀect for our diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. Measurement error, speciﬁct oag i v e n
economy j, would plague all bilateral pairs that involve country j and potentially con-
taminate our results. In addition, we choose as our benchmark a country (Italy) where
trade did not increase as much as in the rest of our sample across all sectors. Assuming
this lack of openness reﬂects macroeconomic factors that are external to each sector’s
price dynamics (for instance exchange rate policies), the Italian benchmark may provide
22Long run estimates are only valid if the explanatory variables are cointegrated. Applying the seven
tests suggested by Pedroni (1999) provides strong support for cointegration, although the variance and
Phillips-Perron ρ test provide some evidence to the contrary.
25us with a classic treatment sample. As shown in Appendix E our results remain little
changed although the signiﬁcance of the reversal eﬀect diminishes.
We consider whether the impact of increased imports depends on their origin, in
particular whether EU imports exert a more signiﬁcant competitive impact than non-EU
imports. During the period covered by our sample, the EU Single Market was established
and EU imports could constitute closer substitutes for domestic production than non-
EU imports. In all cases we were able to accept at standard signiﬁcance levels the
hypothesis that EU and non-EU imports have the same short and long run eﬀects in our
price, productivity and markup equations. Although EU imports may have increased
more rapidly than non-EU imports the estimated elasticities do not diﬀer by import
origin.
Our focus throughout has been on the microeconomic channels through which in-
creased competition impacts on manufacturing industry. We can also use our results
to gauge the direct impact that greater trade openness has had on inﬂation during the
1990s. To assess the contribution of greater openness we consider once again the case of
Italy - the country with the smallest average increase in openness. We use our estimates
to evaluate what would have happened to changes in Italian manufacturing prices if Italy
had experienced an increase in openness equal to our sample’s average. The annual im-
pact of this change would have lowered Italian manufacturing inﬂation by 0.1 percent.
Had Italy experienced the largest increase in openness recorded in our sample it would
have reduced price increases by 0.33 percent per annum. Given that the sectors in our
sample only account for around 9 percent of GDP these estimates suggest that increased
openness has only had a minor role in the reduction of European inﬂation.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We present a theory where openness has pro-competitive eﬀects. We set up the model in
a way that is directly amenable to empirical testing, and in particular to a diﬀerence in
diﬀerences estimation. We show how it is relative openness (and relative ﬁrm dynamics)
that aﬀect relative prices, relative productivity and relative proﬁt margins across the
same sector in diﬀerent countries. This focus on relative openness means that our esti-
mated eﬀects are distinct from alternative explanations based on traditional trade theory
26or the aggregate impact of openness on inﬂation, and emphasize the pro-competitive ef-
fects of trade in a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. We ﬁnd strongly supportive evidence
of the pro-competitive eﬀects of relative openness in the short run: domestic import pen-
etration tends to lower price inﬂation, accelerate productivity and reduce proﬁt margins.
We interpret this evidence as the empirical counterpart to the increased competition
induced by foreign ﬁrms entering the domestic market as a result of diminished trade
costs.
A number of additional predictions of the theory are supported by the data. We
ﬁnd strong eﬀects of foreign import penetration on relative prices, productivity and
margins, and signiﬁcant roles for ﬁrm dynamics and market sizes. Interestingly, we
uncover some evidence supporting the well known notion of tariﬀ jumping, whereby
ﬁrms are attracted to relocating in protected economies. This is often conjectured to
result in anti-competitive eﬀects of (relative) openness, as ﬁrms exit, margins and prices
increase while productivity falls. Both this reversal eﬀect and our estimated elasticities
suggest that whilst increased trade has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on European productivity
the end impact on prices is relatively small. The direct eﬀect of competition on prices
cannot oﬀer much explanation for the fall in European inﬂation, which must therefore
be due to macroeconomic phenomena rather than the microeconomic mechanism that is
our focus.
27Appendix A
BACH sector groupings used in the paper and correspondence with NACE (revision 1) industries
BACH NACE Sector
211 13.0 Metal ores
27.1 Basic iron & steel
27.2 Tubes
27.3 Other ﬁrst processing of basic iron & steel
27.4 Basic precious & non-ferrous metals
212 14.0 Mining & quarrying
26.0 Other non-metallic mineral products
213 24.0 Chemicals & chemical products
221 27.5 Casting of metals
28.0 Fabricated metal products (except machinery & equipment)
29.1 Machinery for the production & use of mechanical power
29.2 Other general purpose machinery
29.3 Agricultural & forestry machinery
29.4 Machine-tools
29.5 Other special purpose machinery
29.6 Weapons & ammunition
33.0 Medical, precision & optical instruments
222 30.0 Oﬃce machinery & computers
31.0 Electrical machinery & apparatus
32.0 Radio, television & communication equipment
29.7 Domestic appliances
223 34.0 Motor-vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers
35.0 Other transport equipment
231 15.0 Food products & beverages
16.0 Tobacco products
232 17.0 Textiles
18.0 Wearing apparel; dressing & dyeing of fur
19.0 Tanning & dressing of leather; luggage, handbags
233 20.0 Wood & products of wood & cork, excl. furniture
21.0 Pulp, paper & paper products
22.0 Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media





Table B1: Prices (Short Run), all country pairs, sector-speciﬁc nominal exchange rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)



























































































N 800 800 720 720 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal. In (5) to (7) instruments for open-
ness include weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Industry-speciﬁc
bilateral nominal exchange rates are included in all regressions.
29Long Run
Table B2: Prices (Long Run), all country pairs, sector-speciﬁc nominal
exchange rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)































































































































N 800 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal. In (3) and (4) instruments for openness
include weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Lt denotes (real) GDP.




Table C1: Prices (Short Run), all country pairs, controlling for factor endowments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)























































































































N 800 800 720 720 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal. In (5) to (7) instruments for openness include
weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. αit denotes an interaction term
between aggregate capital stock and sectoral capital shares.
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Table C2: Prices (Long Run), all country pairs, controlling for factor endowments
(1) (2) (3) (4)








































































































































































N 800 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign CPIs. In (3) and (4) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted distance,
cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Lt denotes (real) GDP. αit denotes an interaction term between




























































N 720 720 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. Instruments for openness include
weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. The number of lagged dependent
variables (one) is chosen in order to reject autocorrelation of order 2. In (2), industry-speciﬁc bilateral
nominal exchange rates are included. In (3), αit denotes an interaction term between aggregate capital
stock and sectoral capital shares.






































N 720 N7 2 0
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. Instruments for openness include
weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. The number of lagged dependent
variables (one) is chosen in order to reject autocorrelation of order 2.
33Long Run
Table D3: Prices, Long Run Arellano-Bond estimations, all country pairs









































































































N 720 720 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. Instruments for openness include
weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. The number of lagged dependent
variables (one) is chosen in order to reject autocorrelation of order 2. Lt denotes (real) GDP. In (2),
industry-speciﬁc bilateral nominal exchange rates are included. In (3), αit denotes an interaction term
between aggregate capital stock and sectoral capital shares.
34Table D4: Productivity and Markups, Long Run Arellano-Bond estimations,
all country pairs
















































































N7 2 0 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. Instruments for openness include
weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. The number of lagged dependent
variables (one) is chosen in order to reject autocorrelation of order 2. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
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Long Run
Table E1: Prices (Long Run), benchmark is Italy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





















































































































































N 260 260 260 234 234
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign CPIs. In (3) to (5) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted distance,
cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
36Table E2: Productivity (Long Run), benchmark is Italy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





























































































































































N 260 260 260 234 234 234 234
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (3) to (7) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted
distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. In (5) wages are instrumented by the average income tax
rate for singles and married individuals and in (6) the number of ﬁrms is further instrumented by its own
lags. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
37Table E3: Markups (Long Run), benchmark is Italy
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )









































































































N 260 260 260 234 234
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (3) to (5) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted
distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
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41Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Inﬂation (%) Import Share (%) Productivity (Ecus/worker) Markups
Country/Sector Average Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max Average Min Max
Belgium 0.4 -2.8 6.9 68.9 32.1 155.8 55,325 20,805 111,973 1.074 1.046 1.112
Germany 0.9 -2.6 5.8 60.4 32.2 129.4 42,066 20,942 58,731 1.308 1.139 1.666
Denmark 1.2 -10.0 16.5 8.2 2.3 24.1 46,139 28,890 99,810 1.358 1.089 1.736
Spain 2.2 -3.3 13.1 81.7 27.9 208.9 35,086 18,545 61,411 1.118 1.007 1.319
France -0.7 -18.5 7.4 50.1 23.2 112.6 62,171 36,215 115,458 1.141 1.038 1.235
Italy 1.9 -7.3 15.2 40.5 21.5 63.3 45,583 24,335 76,245 1.094 1.035 1.127
Netherlands 0.8 -3.4 6.2 108.9 33.8 233.9 41,633 27,617 64,282 1.109 1.015 1.180
Metals -2.1 -18.5 15.2 67.0 48.3 112.6 62,415 36,215 88,808 1.072 1.035 1.127
Non-Metallic Minerals 1.6 -10.0 16.5 35.4 3.2 90.1 45,693 34,245 60,448 1.329 1.154 1.531
Chemicals 0.9 -3.3 13.0 52.6 9.2 146.1 75,003 52,359 115,458 1.198 1.062 1.736
Machinery 2.7 1.3 5.6 110.7 89.7 125.8 29,830 28,113 32,821 1.080 1.025 1.107
Oﬃce Machinery 0.4 -1.6 3.6 77.5 34.1 218.8 42,622 29,620 58,731 1.121 1.064 1.214
Motor Vehicles and Transport 2.1 -0.6 5.1 58.8 14.7 131.6 39,989 28,192 58,553 1.109 1.007 1.257
Food, Tobacco 0.9 -4.4 6.1 30.8 2.3 49.9 43,069 25,995 64,282 1.191 1.046 1.666
Textiles 1.1 -2.7 5.0 123.2 42.0 233.9 27,991 18,545 41,810 1.114 1.052 1.252
Wood, Paper and Printing 1.7 -2.4 13.1 46.4 24.2 75.3 40,550 30,834 61,110 1.166 1.075 1.355
Rubber Products, Furniture 2.0 -0.7 8.7 70.8 5.1 156.6 38,542 25,547 62,469 1.198 1.037 1.398











Non-Metallic Minerals 28.6 48.0
Chemicals 42.8 72.3
Machinery 89.7 113.4
Oﬃce Machinery 58.1 102.8
Motor Vehicles and Transport 51.8 71.3
Food, Tobacco 29.0 34.2
Textiles 105.5 151.3
Wood, Paper and Printing 45.5 53.6
Rubber Products, Furniture 70.1 80.3
















Intercept -1.132 -1.946 -1.993



























Notes: Im-Pesaran-Shin reports values for the W-statistic corresponding to the null hypoth-
esis that there is a unit root that is individual to each cross-section. p-values are reported in
the Table. Im-Pesaran-Shin (CCE) allows for correlated residuals, and continues to report
the statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis that there is a unit root that is individual
to each cross-section. The critical values at the 5% conﬁdence level are -2.16 without in-
tercept, and -2.82 with one. Levin-Lin-Chu reports the Breitung t-statistic corresponding
to the null hypothesis that there is a common unit root process, along with its p-value.
The Hadri test reports the Z-statistic corresponding to the null hypothesis that there is no
common unit root process, along with its p-value.
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Table 4: Prices (Short Run), all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






















































































N 800 800 720 720 800 800 720
∆lnθit =( −1)∆lnθ
∗
it 0.91 0.69 0.39 —— — —
∆lnDit =( −1)∆lnD
∗
it 0.71 0.47 0.13 0.20 0.38 0.25 0.07
∆lnPt =( −1)∆lnP
∗
t — 0.89 0.21 0.27 — 0.89 0.37
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal. In (5) to (7) instruments for openness
include weight-to-value, weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies.
45Table 5: Productivity (Short Run), all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




















































N 800 720 720 800 720
∆lnθit =( −1)∆lnθ
∗
it 0.71 0.82 —— —
∆lnDit =( −1)∆lnD
∗
it 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign openness are equal but can can reject it for the coeﬃcients
on domestic and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (4) and (5) instruments for openness include weight-to-value,
weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies.
46Table 6: Markups (Short Run), all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




















































N 800 720 720 800 720
∆lnθit =( −1)∆lnθ
∗
it 0.82 0.79 ———
∆lnDit =( −1)∆lnD
∗
it 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign openness are equal but can can reject it for the coeﬃcients
on domestic and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (4) and (5) instruments for openness include weight-to-value,
weighted distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies.
47Long Run
Table 7: Prices (Long Run), all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
























































































































N 800 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign CPIs. In (3) and (4) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted distance,
cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
48Table 8: Productivity (Long Run), all country pairs, manufacturing wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













































































































































N 800 800 800 720 720 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (3) to (7) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted
distance, cif/fob and 1992 and 1996 dummies. In (5) wages are instrumented by the average income tax
rate for singles and married individuals and in (6) the number of ﬁrms is further instrumented by its own
lags. Lt denotes (real) GDP.
49Table 9: Markups (Long Run), all country pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)



























































































N 800 800 800 720
Notes: Country/industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions. We cannot reject the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign variables are equal except for the coeﬃcients on domestic
and foreign number of ﬁrms. In (3) and (4) instruments for openness include weight-to-value, weighted








Figure 1: Short Run Effects of Liberalisation
CD
N
Figure 2: Long Run Effects of Liberalisation
Fall in domestic tariffs
Fall in overseas tariffs
51NBB WORKING PAPER No. 91 - OCTOBER 2006 53
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES
1.  "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules" by M. Dombrecht and R. Wouters, Research
Series, February 2000.
2.  "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation" by L. Aucremanne, Research Series,
February 2000.
3.  "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante" by A.  Nyssens, P.  Butzen,
P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000.
4.  "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium" by P. Jeanfils, Research Series, March 2000.
5.  "Growth in an open economy: some recent developments" by S. Turnovsky, Research Series, May 2000.
6.  "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: an OECD perspective" by I. Visco, A.  Bassanini,
S. Scarpetta, Research Series, May 2000.
7.  "Fiscal policy and growth in the context of European integration" by P. Masson, Research Series, May
2000.
8.  "Economic growth and the labour market: Europe's challenge" by C. Wyplosz, Research Series, May
2000.
9.  "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth: a euro-zone perspective" by R.  MacDonald,
Research Series, May 2000.
10.  "Monetary union and economic growth" by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000.
11.  "Politique monétaire et prix des actifs: le cas des Etats-Unis" by Q. Wibaut, Document Series, August
2000.
12.  "The Belgian industrial confidence indicator: leading indicator of economic activity in the euro area?" by
J.J. Vanhaelen, L. Dresse, J. De Mulder, Document Series, November 2000.
13.  "Le financement des entreprises par capital-risque" by C. Rigo, Document Series, February 2001.
14.  "La nouvelle économie" by P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2001.
15.  "De kostprijs van bankkredieten" by A. Bruggeman and R. Wouters, Document Series, April 2001.
16.  "A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal policies" by Ph.  Jeanfils,
Research Series, May 2001.
17.  "Attractive Prices and Euro - Rounding effects on inflation" by L. Aucremanne and D.  Cornille,
Documents Series, November 2001.
18.  "The interest rate and credit channels in Belgium: an investigation with micro-level firm data" by
P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, December 2001.
19  "Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy" by F. Smets and R.  Wouters,
Research series, March 2002.
20.  "Inflation, relative prices and nominal rigidities" by L. Aucremanne, G. Brys, M. Hubert, P. J. Rousseeuw
and A. Struyf, Research series, April 2002.
21.  "Lifting the burden: fundamental tax reform and economic growth" by D. Jorgenson, Research series,
May 2002.
22.  "What do we know about investment under uncertainty?" by L. Trigeorgis, Research series, May 2002.
23.  "Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility: evidence from Belgian accounting data" by D.  Cassimon,
P.-J. Engelen, H. Meersman, M. Van Wouwe, Research series, May 2002.
24.  "The impact of uncertainty on investment plans" by P. Butzen, C. Fuss, Ph. Vermeulen, Research series,
May 2002.
25.  "Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital" by Ch.  P.  Himmelberg, R.  G.  Hubbard,
I. Love, Research series, May 2002.
26.  "Finance, uncertainty and investment: assessing the gains and losses of a generalised non-linear
structural approach using Belgian panel data", by M.  Gérard, F.  Verschueren, Research series,
May 2002.
27.  "Capital structure, firm liquidity and growth" by R. Anderson, Research series, May 2002.
28.  "Structural modelling of investment and financial constraints: where do we stand?" by J.- B. Chatelain,
Research series, May 2002.
29.  "Financing and investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian companies: the role of venture
capital" by S. Manigart, K. Baeyens, I. Verschueren, Research series, May 2002.
30.  "Development path and capital structure of Belgian biotechnology firms" by V.  Bastin, A.  Corhay,
G. Hübner, P.-A. Michel, Research series, May 2002.
31.  "Governance as a source of managerial discipline" by J. Franks, Research series, May 2002.54 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 91 - OCTOBER 2006
32.  "Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms" by M.  Cincera,
Research series, May 2002.
33.  "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints: a corporate governance approach to the Belgian evidence"
by P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2002.
34.  "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies" by I. Maes, Research series, July 2002.
35.  "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area", by F.  Smets and
R. Wouters, Research series, October 2002.
36.  "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour tax reductions: The case of reduction of employers' social
security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing of wages", by
K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju, Research series, March 2003.
37.  "Scope of asymmetries in the Euro Area", by S. Ide and Ph. Moës, Document series, March 2003.
38.  "De autonijverheid in België: Het belang van het toeleveringsnetwerk rond de assemblage van
personenauto's", by F. Coppens and G. van Gastel, Document series, June 2003.
39.  "La consommation privée en Belgique", by B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanfils and B. Robert, Document series,
June 2003.
40.  "The process of European monetary integration: a comparison of the Belgian and Italian approaches", by
I. Maes and L. Quaglia, Research series, August 2003.
41.  "Stock market valuation in the United States", by P. Bisciari, A. Durré and A. Nyssens, Document series,
November 2003.
42.  "Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates: Where Do We Stand?, by K. Maes, Research series,
February 2004.
43.  Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of System Risk in the Belgian Banking System, by
H. Degryse and G. Nguyen, Research series, March 2004.
44.  "How Frequently do Prices change? Evidence Based on the Micro Data Underlying the Belgian CPI", by
L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2004.
45. "Firms' investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty", by C.  Fuss and
Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, April 2004.
46.  "SMEs and Bank Lending Relationships: the Impact of Mergers", by H. Degryse, N. Masschelein and
J. Mitchell, Research series, May 2004.
47.  "The Determinants of Pass-Through of Market Conditions to Bank Retail Interest Rates in Belgium", by
F. De Graeve, O. De Jonghe and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, May 2004.
48.  "Sectoral vs. country diversification benefits and downside risk", by M. Emiris, Research series,
May 2004.
49.  "How does liquidity react to stress periods in a limit order market?", by H. Beltran, A. Durré and P. Giot,
Research series, May 2004.
50. "Financial consolidation and liquidity: prudential regulation and/or competition policy?", by
P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2004.
51.  "Basel II and Operational Risk: Implications for risk measurement and management in the financial
sector", by A. Chapelle, Y. Crama, G. Hübner and J.-P. Peters, Research series, May 2004.
52.  "The Efficiency and Stability of Banks and Markets", by F. Allen, Research series, May 2004.
53.  "Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?" by G. Bekaert, C.R. Harvey and C. Lundblad, Research
series, May 2004.
54.  "Regulating Financial Conglomerates", by X. Freixas, G. Lóránth, A.D. Morrison and H.S. Shin, Research
series, May 2004.
55.  "Liquidity and Financial Market Stability", by M. O'Hara, Research series, May 2004.
56.  "Economisch belang van de Vlaamse zeehavens: verslag 2002", by F.  Lagneaux, Document series,
June 2004.
57.  "Determinants of Euro Term Structure of Credit Spreads", by A.  Van Landschoot, Research series,
July 2004.
58.  "Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy-Making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to
the Hague Summit", by I. Maes, Research series, July 2004.
59.  "Liberalisation of Network Industries: Is Electricity an Exception to the Rule?", by F. Coppens and
D. Vivet, Document series, September 2004.
60.  "Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: an application to the euro area", by F. Smets and
R. Wouters, Research series, September 2004.
61.  "Comparing shocks and frictions in US and Euro Area Business Cycle: a Bayesian DSGE approach", by
F. Smets and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2004.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 91 - OCTOBER 2006 55
62.  "Voting on Pensions: A Survey", by G. de Walque, Research series, October 2004.
63.  "Asymmetric Growth and Inflation Developments in the Acceding Countries: A New Assessment", by
S. Ide and P. Moës, Research series, October 2004.
64.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2002", by F. Lagneaux, Document series,
November 2004.
65.  "Price-setting behaviour in Belgium: what can be learned from an ad hoc survey", by L. Aucremanne and
M. Druant, Research series, March 2005.
66.  "Time-dependent versus State-dependent Pricing: A Panel Data Approach to the Determinants of
Belgian Consumer Price Changes", by L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2005.
67.  "Indirect effects – A formal definition and degrees of dependency as an alternative to technical
coefficients", by F. Coppens, Research series, May 2005.
68.  "Noname – A new quarterly model for Belgium", by Ph. Jeanfils and K. Burggraeve, Research series,
May 2005.
69.  "Economic importance of the Flemish maritime ports: report 2003", F. Lagneaux, Document series, May
2005.
70.  "Measuring inflation persistence: a structural time series approach", M. Dossche and G.  Everaert,
Research series, June 2005.
71.  "Financial intermediation theory and implications for the sources of value in structured finance markets",
J. Mitchell, Document series, July 2005.
72.  "Liquidity risk in securities settlement", J. Devriese and J. Mitchell, Research series, July 2005.
73.  "An international analysis of earnings, stock prices and bond yields", A. Durré and P. Giot, Research
series, September 2005.
74.  "Price setting in the euro area: Some stylized facts from Individual Consumer Price Data", E. Dhyne,
L. J. Álvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, P. Lünnemann, F. Rumler and
J. Vilmunen, Research series, September 2005.
75.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2003", by F. Lagneaux, Document series,
October 2005.
76.  "The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: new survey evidence, by S.  Fabiani, M.  Druant,
I.  Hernando,  C.  Kwapil,  B.  Landau,  C.  Loupias,  F.  Martins,  T.  Mathä,  R.  Sabbatini,  H.  Stahl  and
A. Stokman, Research series, November 2005.
77.  "Income uncertainty and aggregate consumption, by L. Pozzi, Research series, November 2005.
78.  "Crédits aux particuliers - Analyse des données de la Centrale des Crédits aux Particuliers", by
H. De Doncker, Document series, January 2006.
79.  "Is there a difference between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why?" by P. Van Roy,
Research series, February 2006.
80.  "A generalised dynamic factor model for the Belgian economy - Useful business cycle indicators and
GDP growth forecasts", by Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, February 2006.
81.  "Réduction linéaire de cotisations patronales à la sécurité sociale et financement alternatif" by
Ph. Jeanfils, L. Van Meensel, Ph. Du Caju, Y. Saks, K. Buysse and K. Van Cauter, Document series,
March 2006.
82.  "The patterns and determinants of price setting in the Belgian industry" by D. Cornille and M. Dossche,
Research series, May 2006.
83.  "A multi-factor model for the valuation and risk management of demand deposits" by H.  Dewachter,
M. Lyrio and K. Maes, Research series, May 2006.
84.  "The single European electricity market: A long road to convergence", by F.  Coppens and D.  Vivet,
Document series, May 2006.
85.  "Firm-specific production factors in a DSGE model with Taylor price setting", by G. de Walque, F. Smets
and R. Wouters, Research series, June 2006.
86.  "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports and Liège port complex - report
2004", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, June 2006.
87.  "The response of firms' investment and financing to adverse cash flow shocks: the role of bank
relationships", by C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, July 2006.
88.  "The term structure of interest rates in a DSGE model", by M. Emiris, Research series, July 2006.
89.  "The production function approach to the Belgian output gap, Estimation of a Multivariate Structural Time
Series Model", by Ph. Moës, Research series, September 2006.
90.  "Industry Wage Differentials, Unobserved Ability, and Rent-Sharing: Evidence from Matched Worker-
Firm Data, 1995-2002", by R. Plasman, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, Research series, October 2006.56 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 91 - OCTOBER 2006
91.  "The dynamics of trade and competition", by N. Chen, J. Imbs and A. Scott, Research series, October
2006.